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ABSTRACT: Who is a political moderate in the United States
today? What are their stances on important national issues and
who do they think should be the agents affecting structural
change? In what is commonly perceived to be a polarized
political climate in the United States, the middle ground often
seems non-existent. However, if the United States is as
polarized between right and left as some scholars say, then
why do so many Americans self-identify as moderate and why
do studies tend to neglect a prominently existing ideological
group? In the 2014 Chicago Council Survey on American Public
Opinion (n = 2108), moderates were more closely aligned with
liberals on almost every foreign and domestic policy issue
(excluding the size of the military and immigration policy) while
their praxis was slightly more reflective of conservatives.
Partisan sorting theory, an application of Blumer’s symbolic
interactionism in the political arena, did not fully capture the
political moderates, whose ideology did not often match their
praxis.

INTRODUCTION
The political landscape in the United States appears to be polarized between the liberal left and
the conservative right. The current dichotomy is reflected prominently in our gridlocked
Congress and contentious political rhetoric in the media, the means through which the average
citizen consumes politics. However, in the midst of a political climate that is often portrayed as
polarized, there exist those who are neither with one side nor the other. They are self-identified
moderates, and they are rarely the focus in matters pertaining to American politics.
Acknowledging, understanding, and identifying those with moderate political perspectives and
their opinions on who should influence the government could shed light on the feelings of the
large, even if seemingly non-existent American center. Moderates, who are often viewed as the
swing vote (and thus able to influence national election results depending on their leanings),
comprise an important, but overlooked, section of the political population in the United States.
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As the two professionals interviewed for this study reiterated time and time again, no one really
pays attention to or studies them because they are less interesting than the extremes.
This study’s two main goals were: first, to highlight and differentiate the opinions of the political
middle from the conservative right and liberal left; second, to shed light on how different
ideological groups’ opinions on foreign and domestic policy matters influence their preferences
for the influential agents of change in U.S. foreign policy. Preferences for who should influence
the government were defined as their political praxis; the preferences represent the practical
modes and institutions through which conservatives, moderates, and liberals believe change
should come about.
A more thorough understanding of people’s ideologies may be uncovered by distinguishing
ideological groups on their opinions about foreign and domestic policy matters and identifying
how those opinions influenced their political praxis. A more nuanced understanding of each
group’s ideology and praxis (and particularly the ideologies and praxes of those we disagree
with) may enable civil discussions and debates regarding social, economic, or foreign policy
issues. In turn, this could initiate a depolarization of the American political climate by highlighting
moderates’ voices instead of only the often heard conservatives or liberals. Moreover,
moderates’ opinions could offer a third option or a consensual middle ground of compromise
between left and right views in our everyday interactions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A review of extant literature on political polarization and the political middle was conducted in
order to contextualize the relevance and complexity of moderates. For a variety of reasons,
there has been limited research on the hidden, but subtly thriving, political middle. Political
polarization is a particularly complicated phenomenon; it has been measured on vastly different
dimensions like identity and issue positions as well as at varying levels of society ranging from
political elites to the general public.
Political Polarization
Political polarization, when addressed, is a hotly debated topic amongst scholars. For one, the
extent to which it permeates the political climate in the United States is disputed (Baldassarri
and Bearman 2007). The points of contention in the conversations lie in the levels (elite vs.
general public) at which they posit polarization to exist. Some scholars focused their efforts in
observing how party polarization among political elites (i.e. members of Congress and other
elected officials) exists and, in fact, has increased over the last forty years on a number of
issues (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Levendusky 2008).
Using an elite polarization theory framework, these scholars argued that as political elites have
become more polarized in their issue stances, so too, has the general public. Elites are often
the sources or direct informers of political knowledge among the general citizens. As elites take
public stances on issues and implement policy, they send voters clear cues on how the public
should vote or feel about certain issues; in turn the public often conforms to the polarized views
of elites (Levendusky 2008).
On the other hand, scholars like Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope claimed that polarization in the
country is strictly an elite phenomenon (2005). In their book, Culture War? The Myth of a
Polarized America, they argued that Americans are moderate, tolerant, and ambivalent in their
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political attitudes, and that, “we divide evenly in elections or sit them out entirely because we
instinctively seek the center while the parties and candidates hang out on the extremes (Fiorina
et al. 2005: ix).
However, yet another set of experts were not convinced by Fiorina et al.’s work and countered
with new claims that polarization in the electorate is as great or even greater than polarization
amongst political elites. For example, Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) used ANES data from
1972 to 2004 to document the growing gaps between self-identified Democratic and
Republicans. During the three decades between 1972 and 2004, the two party identifiers were
increasingly different on issues such as jobs, living standards, health insurance, and presidential
approval. Another key finding from Abramowitz and Saunders was that secularism and
religiosity separated Democrats from Republicans respectively, citing it as one of the main axes
of difference between red state voters and blue state voters.
In turn, Fiorina (and colleagues Abrams and Pope), in a separate article (2008) defended the
original finding and countered Abramowitz and Saunders’ critiques of the 2005 work on
methodological and empirical grounds. Fiorina et al. argued that the polarization Abramowitz
and Saunders found was only after they did only after extensive recoding and aggregation of
data. Additionally, they (Abramowitz and Saunders) overstated geographic polarization citing
contrary election evidence; many states that vote Democrat in the presidential election elect
Republican governors and vice-versa. Moreover, Fiorina et al. also referred to a 2006 study by
Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder Jr. that characterized most Americans as ideological
moderates on both economic and moral issues.
One finding from Abramowitz and Saunders’ 2005 study that was not refuted by Fiorina et al.
was that more people identified as Republicans or Democrats in 2004 than did in 1972,
revealing some semblance of a polarization dynamic. However, it is not clear whether increased
partisanship on certain political issues subsequently spills over to polarization in the general
American public. For example, while Baldassarri and Gelman found partisanship and alignment
on various issues to be positively correlated, the relationship was weak. They concluded, “since
the parties are now more clearly divided on a broader set of issues – it is easier for people to
split accordingly, without changing their own views” (2008: 37). Their study harked back to the
idea of elite polarization (in a sense) more uniformly locating the voting public to the left or the
right. Yet, the opinions held by the general public on a wide range of issues had not
concurrently changed along party lines, indicating that more polarized identification did not
coincide with corresponding partisan opinions. Furthermore, a more recent study by Wood and
Oliver (2012) questioned if there existed any meaningful relationship between people’s
ideological self-identification and their political attitudes or behavior. Ideological selfidentification was found to be temporally unstable and did not directly correspond consistently
on issue stances. On balance, Wood and Oliver concluded that the general public was less
polarized than some posit.

Political Sorting
Political sorting has been another theme in the scholarship on politics. According to the political
sorting model, political partisan identities have converged with ideological, religious, and
movement-based politics (Mason 2012). For example, Republicans have sorted themselves
into categories like conservative, religious, pro-life, and racially not black while Democrats are
generally considered to be liberal, secular, pro-choice, and more often black. As these identities
have converged more consistently, individual identities and political parties have converged
154
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creating a more salient identity for, let’s say, a Republican. The result of the more sharply
defined identities is more in-group bias, more active defending of one’s own party, and anger
towards the other party (Mason 2012). Mason’s political sorting complemented Baldassari and
Bearman’s self-segregation into ideologically homogenous groups in which all people within the
group shared the same political opinions (2007). Even though public opinion was generally
heterogeneous (and thus less polarized than the homogenous groups would suggest), Mason
acknowledged that in-group bias, anger towards the other party, and opinion-homogeneous
groups, among other factors, contributed to social polarization but not issue polarization (2015).
Multiple Determinants of Ideology
Mason’s (2012) political sorting concept intimated salient factors that have contributed to
semblances of polarization in the general public along conservative versus liberal ideologies.
More recent scholars specified some of the factors and life experiences that shape political
ideology. Bond and Solomon’s 2015 Facebook survey of 78,000 Facebook users found age,
marital status, and gender to be important. Some examples: the older people got the more
conservative they became; married people tended to be more conservative than the not
married; and women tended to be more liberal than men.
Similarly, Baldassarri and Goldberg identified socioeconomic factors (education and income)
that contributed to people’s political ideologies (2014). In their study they identified three distinct
groups: ideologues, alternatives, and agnostics, each of who had their own belief system based
on their level of education and income. The alternative group was a particular point of interest
because they were comparable to moderates. The more economically affluent and bettereducated in the alternate group were more conservative on economic issues but were more
liberal on social and moral issues. Not only were there multiple factors that contributed to the
alternative group’s ideology, there were also multiple layers within it, adding further complexity
to the concept of ideology in sharp contrast to a singular self-identification. Additional, even if
less salient, components in political ideologies were egalitarianism and political sophistication;
Feldman and Johnston found that egalitarianism and less religiosity predicted economic and
social liberalism (2010). Approaching the determinants of political ideology from more than just
a demographic standpoint offers insight to citizens’ worldviews, which were also proven to
influence their political ideologies.

The Forgotten Middle
As evident in the scholarship reviewed above, the political middle has been largely forgotten. A
notable exception is a recent 2014 study conducted by the Pew Research Center (PRC) where
the political middle was the focus. The political middle in the Pew research Center study was
comparable to the alternatives and agnostic groups in Baldassarri and Goldberg’s work. But, the
PRC political middle straddled a demographically diverse landscape. Some specifics illustrate
the diversity in the political middle. The political middle was comprised of three distinct groups:
Young Outsiders, who leaned Republican and were affluent and well-educated, wary of big
government but liberal on social issues; the Hard-pressed Skeptics, who leaned Democratic,
were poorly educated, economically disenfranchised, and were the most distrustful of the
government; the Next Generation Left, who leaned Democratic and were well-educated and
affluent, liberal on social issues but hesitant about the social safety net and sympathetic toward
Wall Street; It was noteworthy that a larger portion of the less partisan middle the PRC data
leaned toward the Democratic party (Pew Research Center 2014).
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A second recent study jointly by Esquire and NBC News in 2012 demarcated the “American
Center” but also highlighted the diversity within it. They too identified sub-groups in the political
center that were similar to most of PRC groupings. For example, the Whateverman, young
voters in the Northeast and West who were politically apathetic were comparable to PRC’s
Hard-Pressed Skeptics. The Pick-up Populists, who were mostly white, low-income voters in the
South and Midwest who worried the economy is unfair and that government is wasteful were
also comparable to the Hard-Pressed Skeptics. The MBA Middle, mostly white, well-educated
and affluent voters who were fiscally conservative but socially liberal were much like PRC’s
Young Outsiders. Only the Minivan Moderates, mostly white suburban mothers in the Midwest
and South with pro-choice/anti-gun tendencies and a distrust of government, were not
comparable to any of the PRC groupings. In short, the very existence of distinct political groups
and divisions within them indicates that a person’s political ideology is not unidimensional, let
alone being classified as conservative, moderate, or liberal.

Summary and Moving Forward
It is quite clear that the elites in the United States are polarized. It is also clear that elite
polarization has contributed to sorting the general public along party lines, but not their opinions.
Political sorting has occurred along party identities and ideologies (i.e. Republican and
Democrat) as well as other salient socio-demographic characteristics like religiosity, and race.
However, even as Americans become more frequently sorted into distinct partisan poles, the
political middle is alive and richly diverse demographically and in its attitudes towards
government. For example, people’s political self-identifications often conflict with their opinions
(Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). Besides, Americans in general are ideologically moderate in
their issue positions and opinions (Fiorina et al. 2005, 2007 & Ansolabehere et al. 2006).
Yet, this less partisan group, which comprises a sizable percentage of the general American
population, has rarely been the focus of much research. Even though data on the political
moderates do exist, a more nuanced analysis has been lacking. The research presented in this
paper squarely focused on the forgotten middle.
RESEARCH QUESTION
The limited research that exists on moderates has categorized them as monolithic, more
economically conservative and generally more conservative across the board (Baldassarri and
Goldberg 2008 & Pew Research Center 2005). In order to test these singular claims about
political moderates, the middle or moderates were contrasted against conservatives and liberals
on the following dimensions: their identities, opinions on various foreign and domestic policy
issues and suggested praxis ideas. Also largely unknown is how issue positions and opinions
shaped who the American people believe should be influencing policy decisions. That is, not
much is known about how people arrive at their political praxes, the practical means and agents
through which Americans want to see change enacted. The specific change agents considered
in this analysis were the American people, elected officials, civil institutions, religious leaders,
and military leaders.
In this vein, two sets of formal research questions were posed: To what extent were identity
symbols, opinions of political moderates on issues and related praxis distinctive from or

156

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

5

Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 14 [2016], Art. 11

reflective of conservatives and liberals? (2) Which, if any, of the three axes, identity symbols
and/or issue/praxis opinions, uniquely identify moderates?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Extending Political Sorting Beyond Symbolic Referents
According to the partisan sorting theory self-identifications have converged along ideological,
religious, racial, and gendered lines. These facets of partisan and ideological identities
represent symbolic referents that people attach significance to in order to differentiate
themselves from other groups. At the root of sorting theory is symbolic interactionism, which has
three basic premises according to the theorist, Herbert Blumer: First, “human beings act toward
things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them.” Second, “the meaning of
such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s
fellows.” Third, these meanings are “handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process
used by the person in dealing the things he encounters” (Blumer 1969:2). The “things” that
Blumer referred to can be anything sociological such as social position, social roles, cultural
prescriptions, norms and values, and group affiliation to name a few (Blumer 1969:3).
Where do moderates fit on the political sorting spectrum? If, as previous researchers have
suggested, partisan sorting in the American political arena takes place along partisan and
ideological salient identity symbols (such as religiosity, race, education, and income), it was
predicted that salient identities markers would be the primary axes along which moderates were
separated from the two other groups at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. On the other
hand, a case can be made that the political sorting has occurred along opinions on issues that
are generally less sorted and less polarized than salient identity factors. Further, if it is issue
opinions, an overlooked, symbolically meaningful referents, that differentiate the three
ideological groups it was predicted that moderates will reflect the opinions and praxes of both
conservatives and liberals, with a slight tendency to lean to the left both on the ideologicalpraxis spectrum’ praxes from one another. In other words, moderates, who supposedly carry a
mix of conservative and liberal views as the term implies have not been sorted (Pew Research
Center 2014).
METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
The explanatory sequential mixed methods design used in this study was structured as follows:
Analysis of secondary quantitative data provided a statistical overview of the positions of
moderates, liberals, and conservatives on a variety of national issues and salient identity
markers. These profiles were then supplemented, post-quantitative analysis, by narrative
interview insights from experts in the field of political science. The findings from the two
approaches were compiled into a singular portrait of the political moderates in the U.S.
Secondary Survey Data
The quantitative survey data used in this study were drawn from 2014 The Chicago Council
Survey of American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. The Gfk Group (Gfk, formerly
Knowledge Networks) conducted the survey on behalf of The Chicago Council of Global Affairs.
GfK sampled households from its KnowledgePanel, a probability-based web panel designed to
157
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be representative of the United States; there were 3,146 people surveyed with a response rate
of 61% (Smeltz, Kafura, Daalder, Page, Holyk, Busby, Monten, and Tama 2014) 2.
One necessary clarification pertaining to the quantitative data must be disclosed. Because many
of the opinion questions had response rates of 50% or less, multiple imputations were used to
analyze missing data based on respondents’ answers to other questions with higher response
rates. In essence, around half of the responses to public opinion questions have been
determined through missing data analysis and represent more complete estimates of
respondents’ answers.
Qualitative Interviews
Two interviews were conducted with experts in the field of political science. Interviewee #1 has
eleven years of experience in the field, specializing in voting behavior, political psychology, and
the news media. Interviewee #2 has four years of experience with a keen interest in political
psychology and people’s ideologies at the end of their lives. Their professional perspectives
were used to expand on the survey findings. Refer to Appendix A for Consent Form and
Interview Protocol.

DATA ANALYSES
In the following sections, salient identities, issue opinions, and praxis ideas of political
moderates were compared to liberals and conservatives. The analyses offered a comparative
descriptive portrait of identity markers, issue and praxis positions of the three groups. Gamma
correlations tests, which measured differences in opinions between two ideological groups, at a
time, were used to sort out the three groups. Γ < .30 was treated as a marker of opinion
convergence while Γ > .30 was treated as opinion polarization.

Profiles of Moderates
Univariate analyses were used to profile moderates, liberals, and conservatives along salient
identity markers and political ideologies. Two dimensions of ideologies were used; issue
opinions and praxis recommendations.

Political Ideology
The sample population was more conservative (36.3%) than liberal (28.1%). But moderates, at
35.6%, made up a comparably sizeable portion of the respondents (Table 1.A). Respondents in
the survey self-identified their political identification.

2

The original collector if the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for
use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.
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Table 1.A Self-Identified Political Ideology
Indicator

Values and
Responses

Statistics
(n = 2067)

Q1005. In general, do you
think of yourself as extremely
liberal, liberal, slightly liberal
moderate, slightly
conservative, conservative, or
extremely conservative?

1 = Conservative
2 = Moderate
3 = Liberal

36.3%
35.6
28.1

Salient Identity Markers
On average, conservatives made the most money and were the most highly educated, followed
by liberals and moderates respectively (Table 2). The modal liberal (36.1%) and conservative
(34.9%) had at least a college degree; in contrast the average moderate was a high school
graduate (37.8%).
Table 2. Sociodemographic Identity Markers
Indicators

Statistics1

Values and
Responses
Con.
(n=750)
12.47
(4.23)
1-19

PPINCIMP:
Household
Income2

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

PPEDUCAT:
Highest
Degree
Received

1 = Less than HS
2 = High school
3 = Some college
4 = Bachelors
degree or higher

10.1%
29.6
25.3
34.9

PPAGECAT4:
Age

1 = 18-29
2 = 30-44
3 = 45-59
4 = 60+

14.5%
22.3
27.5
35.7

Gender

0 = Male
1 = Female

56.4%
43.6

1 = Rural
2 = Suburban
3 = Urban

29.7%
51.5
18.3

1 = More than
once a week
2 = Once a week
3 = Once/twice a
month
4 = Several times
a year
5 = Hardly ever
6 = Never

14.9%

Living Setting

Q.1075 Apart
from weddings
and funerals,
how often do
you attend
religious
services?

What is your
race?

30.4
7.4

CM
r=∆
-.13**

-.11**

-.09**

.11**

ø

Mod.
(n=736)
11.28
(4.78)
1-19
12.2%
37.8
25.5
24.5

17.7%
26.0
30.6
25.8
45.9%
54.1
29.5%
47.7
22.8

ML
r=∆
.06*

.09**

ø

ø

.14**

7.4%
.20**

18.9
9.1

Lib.
(n=581)
11.84
(4.64)
1-19
15.0%
24.4
24.4
36.1

17.9%
27.4
27.0
27.7
49.6%
50.4
19.7%
47.1
33.2

ø

16.4
8.3

11.5

13.8

20.0
14.0

31.8
21.3

29.0
26.4

57.5%
.19**

Ø

-.09**

.07*

.17**

.25**

52.5%
ø

42.5

-.07**

6.2%

13.3

0 = White Non75.2%
Hispanic
1 = Not White
24.8
** p < .01, * p < .05, or ø non-significant levels.

CL
r=∆

.24**
47.5
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Conservatives were the oldest group by almost 4 years on average (51.39) followed by
moderates (47.67) and then liberals (47.12). Conservatives were also the only male-dominated
group (56.4%) while liberals and moderates were majority women; moderates being the most
female-dominated group (54.6%).
The majority of conservatives (51.9%) and the plurality of moderates and liberals (47.7% and
47.1% respectively) lived in the suburbs, but conservatives and moderates were more likely to
be from rural areas while liberals were most likely to live in urban areas. Additionally,
conservatives were by far the most religious group; 52.6% conservatives attended monthly
religious services at the very least while 53.1% of moderates and 55.4% of liberals attended
religious services hardly ever or never.
Thus, moderates, while they had a unique sociodemographic identity, can be sorted as leaning
towards liberals in their sociodemographic make-up. They were slightly younger than
conservatives, more likely to be women, being less religious, and not being white.

Issue Opinions
A variety of issues of national and global importance were covered in the analyses. They ranged
from past and present military matters, to immigration policy, climate change and the United
States’ energy production strategies, diplomatic relationships with foreign governments and
leaders, and domestic government spending. In the analyses to follow, conservative, moderate,
and liberal groups were disaggregated so that their opinions on issues could be ascertained.
The ultimate goal was to see whether moderates were closer to conservatives or liberals in both
their stances on different issues.

Opinions on Military Issues
Military matters carry great weight in the overall standing of the United States. Public opinion
about the role of the military is an important measure of political ideology in the U.S. Opinions
about important military issues covered the size of the military as well as past/present military
decisions by the American military.
As seen in Table 3.A, to moderates, like their conservatives counterparts, maintaining military
superiority worldwide was very important. At the same time moderates, like liberals wanted
reduced military presence in Afghanistan and were convectively against the two wars on terror.
In other words, moderates wished to protect the perception that the U.S. is able to defend itself,
but only if absolutely necessary.
Some specifics from Table 3.A. are useful to elaborate on these broad patterns. The majority of
moderates (53.7%) and conservatives (62.7%) believed that maintaining military superiority
worldwide was very important while the plurality of liberals (45.4%) believed so. Even though
moderates were more partial in prioritizing the size of the military, they remained closer to
liberals on military issues, advocating (like liberals) that troops be brought home from
Afghanistan on time or sooner and giving strong consensus with liberals that the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not worth it. While all three groups agreed that the two wars on terror
were ultimately not worth it, moderates still leaned slightly towards liberals’ side in their dissent
towards the wars (CM Γ = .30**, ML Γ = .21** and CM Γ = .17**, ML Γ = .07**).
160
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Table 3.A. Public Opinion on Military Issues
Indicators

Q7.2
04 Maintaining
military
superiority
worldwide
Q270.3

Q2274

Con.
(n=721750)

CM
Γ=∆

Statistics1
Mod.
(n=722736)

1 = Not important at all
2 = Somewhat important
3 = Very important

7.5%
29.9
62.7

ø

8.3%
38.0
53.7

1 = Withdraw all troops
from Afghanistan before
the end of 2014

20.8%

2 = Bring all troops
home as scheduled by
the end of 2014

36.1

3 = Leave some troops
in Afghanistan beyond
2014

43.1

0 = Not worth it

37.8%

Values and Responses

Q2715

0 = Not worth it

32.1%

Index of Public
Opinion on
Military Issues6

67.9

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

4.53
(1.60)
2-8

ø

11.2%
43.4
45.4

.30**

32.2%

42.2
.07

29.6

17.6%
.21**

75.5

.48**
82.4

25.4%

22.8%
.07**

74.6%

.22**

.30**

25.6

24.5%

.17**
1 = Worth it

CL
Γ=∆

40.8

.30**
62.2

Lib.
(n=571581)

29.6%

.24**

1 = Worth it

ML
Γ=∆

5.05 (1.46)
2-8

.23**
77.2

.13**

5.32
(1.42)
2-8

.34**

CM Γ = ∆, ML Γ = ∆, CL Γ = ∆ represents the difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates, moderates
and liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively; ** p < .01, * p < .05, or ø non-significant levels.
2
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you
think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important policy goal, or not
an important goal at all:
3
Currently the U.S. is scheduled to withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Do you think that the
U.S. should: Withdraw all troops from Afghanistan before the end of 2014, bring all troops home as scheduled by the end
of 2014, or leave some troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014 for training, anti-insurgency and counter terrorism activities?
4
All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United, do you think the war in Iraq was
worth fighting, or not?
5
And what about the war in Afghanistan? All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the
United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not?
6
Index of Pub. Op. on Military Issues = Q7_04 + Q270 + Q227 + Q271.
1

Immigration Policy
Immigration policy was a second vector along which the three ideological groups were
compared. In recent times, illegal immigration at the U.S.-Mexico border and the admittance of
Syrian refugees has sparked contentious debates regarding the strictness with which the United
States should enforce in its immigration policy. As a hot button issue in today’s political
landscape, opinions on questions about large numbers of immigrants coming to the United
States and illegal immigration were investigated.
Another rare area in which moderates were more closely aligned with conservatives was
immigration policy (Table 3.B.). Even though the plurality of moderates and liberals believed that
161
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large numbers of immigrants coming to the United States was an important but not critical
threat, more moderates (35.1%) saw the influx of immigrants as a critical threat than as not an
important threat at all (23.6%). In contrast, liberals were more likely (37.7%) to think that
immigration was not an important threat; only a fifth (22.5%) said it was a critical threat.
Table 3.B. Public Opinion on Immigration Policy
Indicators

Con,
(n=750)

CM
Γ=∆

Statistics1
Mod.
(n=736)

ML
Γ=∆

Lib.
(n=581)

CL
Γ=∆

.15***

35.1%
41.3

.28***

22.5%
39.8

.40***

Values / Responses

Q52
08 Large
numbers of
immigrants
coming to the
United States

1 = Critical threat
2 = Important but not
critical threat
3 = Not an important
threat

45.6%
33.3

Q73
08 Controlling
and reducing
illegal
immigration

1 = Very important
2 = Somewhat
important
3 = Not important at all

57.1%
36.5

21.1

23.6

.17**

6.4

48.2%
42.7
9.1

37.7

.27**

34.1%
49.9

.42***

16.0

Index of Public
Mean
3.25
3.49
3.97
.15**
.27**
.39**
Opinion on
(SD)
(1.28)
(1.26)
(1.28)
Immigration
Min-Max
2-6
2-6
2-6
Policy4
1
CM Γ = ∆, ML Γ = ∆, CL Γ = ∆ represents the difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates, moderates
and liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively; ** p < .01, * p < .05, or ø
non-significant levels.
2
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please
select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:
3
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether
you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important policy goal, or
not an important goal at all.
4
Index of Public Opinion on Immigration Policy: Q5_08 + Q7_03.

In short, moderates and liberals were further apart in their immigration policy opinions than they
were from conservatives (ML Γ = .28**, CM Γ = .15**). In fact, the majority of conservatives
(57.1%) and the plurality of moderates (48.2%) viewed controlling and reducing illegal
immigration as a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, while the plurality of
liberals (49.9%) believed it was only a somewhat important goal. The closer alignment between
conservatives and moderates (CM Γ = .15**) on immigration matters than between moderates
and liberals (ML Γ = .27**) was evident in the overall immigration opinion index; opinions of
moderates on immigration policy were more reflective of conservatives than liberals.

Environmental Issues.
A third issue that has grabbed national and even global attention is the environment. While
there is consensus within the scientific community that climate change is real and that humans
are contributing to global warming, polarized political rhetoric divides conservatives and liberals
on the subject; conservatives are often labeled as climate deniers while liberals are more
commonly viewed as the bastions of the environmental movement. Therefore, this is a critical
area in which to examine where moderates fall (Table 3.C).
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Table 3.C. Public Opinion on Environmental Issues
Indicators

Q5_092
Climate
Change

3

Q310

Q320 1-64
Q320_15

Q320_26

Q320_37

Q320_48

Q320_59

Q320_610

Q320_7

Index of
Environmental
Issues12

Lib.
(n = 581)
12.4%

33.9

Statistics1
Mod.
ML
(n = 736)
Γ=∆
18.3%
.23***
39.1

27.3

42.5

55.6

Values / Responses

1= Not an important
threat
2 = Important but not
critical threat
3 = Critical threat

Con.
(n = 750)
38.8%

CM
Γ=∆
.36***

39.1%
35.2
25.7

54.8

73.6

1 = Strongly oppose
2 = Somewhat oppose
3 = Somewhat favor
4 = Strongly favor
1 = Strongly favor
2 = Somewhat favor
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose

14.0%
20.3
37.0
28.7
34.2%
39.3
19.1
7.3

5.2%
16.9
38.0
38.9
18.5%
40.6
27.1
13.8

4.0%
10.7
26.9
58.4
14.6%
29.9
31.2
24.3

1 = Strongly favor
2 = Somewhat favor
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose
1 = Strongly oppose
2 = Somewhat oppose
3 = Somewhat favor
4 = Strongly favor

46.3%
34.2
14.7
4.8
12.8%
27.4
39.6
20.2

1 = Strongly favor
2 = Somewhat favor
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose
1 = Strongly favor
2 = Somewhat favor
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose

29.9%
39.6
24.7
5.7
39.7%
44.6
11.3
4.4

1 = Strongly oppose
2 = Somewhat oppose
3 = Somewhat favor
4 = Strongly favor
Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

37.9%
38.0
18.8
15.3
18.75
(4.53)
9-33

ø

.30*

ø

ø

ø

.23**

.27*

.42*

8.7%
36.5

25.4%
42.8
21.9
9.9
7.2%
21.0
42.3
29.5
15.4%
44.1
29.2
11.4
26.7%
50.8
18.7
3.9
21.4%
45.3
25.2
8.1
21.84
(3.58)
9-34

.35***

ø

.22*

ø

ø

ø

-.06

.35*

.34*

.53***

32.0

1 = Too much
2 = About the right
amount
3 = Not enough

.58***

CL
Γ=∆

6.7%
19.7

18.5%
32.6
24.7
24.2
4.0%
12.6
38.2
45.2
13.0%
30.6
31.1
25.3
30.8%
47.7
16.5
4.9
13.5%
32.4
30.1
24.0
24.24
(4.29)
9-34

.74***

.48***
.48***

.54***

.48***

.46***

.17**

.53***

.64***

CM Γ = ∆, ML Γ = ∆, CL Γ = ∆ represent difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates, moderates and
liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively; **p < .01, *p < .05, or ø non-significant.
2
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please
select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:
3
To deal with the problem of climate change, do you think your govt. is doing:
4
Thinking about how to address America’s dependence on foreign energy sources, please indicate whether you favor or
oppose each of the following:
5
Increasing tax incentives to encourage the development and use of alternative energy sources;
6
Increase the use of hydraulic fracturing to extract oil and natural gas from underground rock formations;
7
Opening up land owned by the federal government for oil exploration;
8
Requiring auto-makers to increase fuel efficiency, even if the car price would go up;
9
Increasing the mining and use of coal for generating electricity;
10
Maintaining existing nuclear power plants to reduce reliance on oil and coal;
11
Raising taxes on fuels such as coal and oil to encourage individuals and businesses to use less.
12
Index of Pub. Op. on environmental issues = Q5_09 + Q310 Q320_01 + Q320_02 + Q320_03 + Q320_04 + Q320_05 +
Q320_06 + Q320_07.
1
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Moderates and liberals agreed that climate change was a real problem (Table 3.C.). And
moderates more often than not aligned with liberals’ views on how to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil. The plurality of moderates (42.5%) and majority of liberals (55.6%) believed climate
change was a critical threat while the plurality of conservatives (38.8%) believed it was not an
important threat. The majority of moderates (54.8%) and liberals (73.6%) thought that the
government was not doing enough to deal with climate change while the plurality of
conservatives (39.1%) thought the government was doing too much. And more often than not
moderates aligned with liberals’ views on strategies that would reduce our dependence on
foreign oil.
On possible actions that the government should take to reduce our dependence on foreign oil,
moderates were more likely to be closer to liberals than they were to conservatives. As for
possible actions that the government can take to reduce the nation’s dependence on foreign oil,
moderates aligned more closely with liberals than with conservatives. Some examples:
moderates and liberals both strongly favored the development and use of alternative energy
sources through tax incentives (38.9% and 58.4% respectively) while conservatives (37.0%)
showed less supportive of this strategy. Even though conservatives and moderates (pluralities)
favored (somewhat) fracking to extract oil and natural gas with liberals opposing this strategy,
moderates were further apart from conservatives (CM Γ = .30**) than from liberals (ML Γ =
.22**).
Opinion ambiguities were also found on strategies ranging from opening up federal land for
exploration, to requiring automakers to make more fuel-efficient cars, and increasing coal
mining for electricity use; moderates were effectively in between both conservatives and liberals
with no leaning to either side, standing alone in their middle of the road opinions. When it came
to maintaining nuclear power plants, conservatives stood alone in favoring their upkeep the
most while moderates and liberals shared slightly less favorable views on the strategy though it
is notable that the differences in opinion were weak (CM Γ = .23**, CL Γ = .17**, ML Γ not
significant). Moderates did reflect conservatives more on raising taxes on coal and oil (CM Γ =
.27*, ML Γ = .35*), as both groups opposed the idea while liberals were generally in favor of the
strategy.
Overall, moderates were slightly closer to liberals than conservatives on environmental issues,
as evidenced by the index of environmental issues (CM Γ = .42*, ML Γ = .34*); the index also
revealed wider differences in opinion between all three groups than on any other topical issue.
The large difference in opinion between conservatives and liberals on environmental issues (Γ =
.64**) proved environmental issues to be the most polarized area of opinion amongst all that
were observed.

Foreign Relations
Economic and diplomatic foreign relations represent non-military approaches to dealing with the
leadership of various countries and organizations. The extent to which each ideological group
wanted to engage in diplomacy with foreign leaders before resorting to military issues was
viewed as another axis along which the three ideological groups might differ. Questions
pertaining to foreign relations addressed people’s perceptions of foreign economic and national
security threats and attitudes towards controversial foreign leaders and organizations, as well as
the historic Iran nuclear deal (Table 3.D).
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Table 3.D. Public Opinion on Foreign Relations
Indicators

Q5.2
02 U.S. debt to
China
04 Islamic
fundamentalism

.20*

Statistics1
Mod.
(n = 736)
46.2%
44.0

.20*

9.8
37.8%
48.8

Values/Responses

1 = Critical threat
2 = Important but not
critical
3 = Not important
1 = Critical threat
2 = Important but not
critical threat
3 = Not important

Con.
(n = 750)
57.3%
35.5
7.2
49.6%
39.7

CM
Γ=∆

10.7

ML
Γ=∆
.12*

Lib.
(n = 581)
41.0%
44.6

.11*

14.5
34.6%
45.4

13.5

CL
Γ=∆
.31***

.29**

20.0

3

Q175.
01 Taliban

0 = Should not be
1 = Should be

58.9%
41.1

26***

45.9%
54.1

.05

43.6%
56.4

.30***

0 = Should not be
1 = Should be
0 = Should not be
1 = Should be

40.7%
59.3
59.3%
40.7

ø

29.8%
70.2
45.0%
55.0

ø

22.3%
77.7
37.0%
63.0

.41***

0 = Should not be
1 = Should be
0 = Should not be
1 = Should be

43.8%
56.2
31.4%
68.6

.20*

34.4%
65.6
22.5%
77.5

10*

29.8%
70.2
16.7%
83.3

.30***

06 Hezbollah

0 = Should not be
1 = Should be

59.0%
41.0

ø

46.0%
54.0

ø

36.5%
63.5

.43***

Q239.4

0 = Oppose
1 = Favor
1 = Strongly oppose
2 = Somewhat oppose
3 = Somewhat support
4 = Strongly support

48.3%
51.7
61.5%
22.1
10.2
6.2

ø

34.3%
65.7
44.6%
30.6
17.4
7.4

ø

25.0%
75.0
47.2%
30.1
15.8
6.9

.47***

1 = Strongly oppose
2 = Somewhat oppose
3 = Somewhat support
4 = Strongly support
1 = Strongly support
2 = Somewhat support
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose
1 = Strongly support
2 = Somewhat support
3 = Somewhat oppose
4 = Strongly oppose

13.4%
12.6
32.8
41.2
66.1%
22.9
6.3
4.7
36.9%
34.8
20.2
8.1

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

15.61
(4.16)
6-27

02 Iran
03 Hamas

04 North Korea
05 Cuba

Q240.5
01 Not pressure
Iran to stop
enriching uranium
02 Continue
diplomatic efforts
to get Iran to stop
enriching uranium
03 Impose tighter
economic
sanctions on Iran
04 Authorize a
military strike
against Iran’s
nuclear energy
facilities
Index of Public
Opinion on foreign
relations6

.28**

ø

.27**

ø

.21**

ø

.29**

6.5%
12.2
36.5
44.8
53.4%
33.0
9.3
4.2
26.0%
37.8
24.3
11.9
17.56
(3.56)
6-27

.16**

ø

-.05

ø

-.06

ø

.17**

5.4%
8.7
33.0
52.8
57.0%
29.8
8.5
4.8
21.2%
30.2
27.4
21.2
18.58
(3.36)
6-28

.42***

.39***

.23***

.24***

ø

.35***

.44***

CM Γ = ∆, ML Γ = ∆, CL Γ = ∆ represents the difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates, moderates
and liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively; **p < .01, *p < .05, or ø non-significant.
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please
select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all:
3
As you may know there is currently a debate about whether U.S. government leaders should be ready to meet and talk
with leaders of countries and groups whom the U.S. has hostile or unfriendly relations. Do you think the U.S. leaders
should or should not be ready to meet and talk with the leaders of:
4
As you may know, the U.S. and other countries have reached an interim deal with Iran that eases some of the
international economic sanctions against Iran. In exchange, the deal requires that Iran accept some restrictions on its
nuclear program - but not end it completely - and submit to greater international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Do you
favor or oppose this interim agreement?
5
If Iran commits a major violation of this agreement, would you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or
strongly oppose the UN Security Council taking each of the following actions:
6
Index of Pub. Op. on foreign relations = Q5_02 + Q5_04 + Q175_01 + Q175_02 + Q175_03 + Q175_04 + Q175_05 +
Q175_06 + Q239 + Q240_01 + Q240_02 + Q240_03 + Q240_04.
1

2
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On matters pertaining to foreign relations, moderates either reflected liberal views or stood
alone separate from both other groups (Table 3.D). For example, moderates and liberals were
more convergent in their beliefs that our debt to China and Islamic fundamentalism were not as
a critical of threats as conservatives believed (Debt: ML Γ = .12*, CM Γ = .20*, Islam: ML Γ =
.11*, CM Γ = .20*). Additionally, moderates and liberals were most likely to believe that our
government leaders should be willing to meet and talk with the leaders of the Taliban, Iran,
Hamas, North Korea, Cuba, and Hezbollah over conservatives, who were outright in their
opposition to the idea of meeting with terrorist groups (the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah); the
exception was the majority of conservatives did believe that U.S. leaders should be meeting
with the governments of Iran, North Korea, and Cuba.
There were similar alignments in the opinions on the Iran nuclear deal. Moderates and liberals
were most in favor of the deal while conservatives displayed haphazard support. In regards to
what measures should be taken if Iran breaks any part of the nuclear deal, moderates either
tended to directly reflect liberals or be effectively between conservatives and liberals. While the
three groups tended to show opinion convergence with respect to the U.S. response toward
violations, conservatives favored the harshest measures in response to any violations that may
occur, including their strong support for authorizing a military strike against Iran’s energy
facilities. Overall, the index of public opinion on foreign relations confirmed that moderates were
more reflective of liberals than conservatives (CM Γ = .29**, ML Γ = .17**).

Government Spending
While government spending mostly addressed domestic policy (excluding defense spending),
uncovering the opinions of the three groups on aspects of government that more directly affect
the American people was treated as an important area of ideological distinctions (Table 3.E).
It was noteworthy that there was a general consensus among the three groups on the actions
regarding three out of the five areas of government spending (education spending, defense
spending, and Social Security spending). At the same time, opinions on government spending
revealed a distinct separation of conservatives from moderates and liberals across most fiscal
issues. Moderates (74.5%) and liberals (78.5%) most wanted to expand education spending
with conservatives slightly lagging behind in their support. Moderates found themselves
effectively in between the other two groups when it came to defense spending. Liberals (39.6%)
were most in favor of cutting back on defense spending as opposed to conservatives (32.0%)
who were most in favor of expanding it. The majority of moderates (57.3%) and liberals (61.1%)
were in favor of expanding Social Security as opposed to only the plurality of conservatives
(45.2%) who wanted to expand it. Stark differences emerged on healthcare spending and
welfare spending. The majority of moderates (59.1%) and liberals (67.6%) expressed favoritism
toward government healthcare in wanting to expand healthcare spending; conversely, the
majority of conservatives (64.0%) wanted it kept the same or cut back. On welfare and
unemployment programs the majority of conservatives (59.9%) and the plurality of moderates
(37.6%) wanted to cut back on these programs contrary to the plurality of liberals (37.5%) who
wanted the programs expanded. However, moderates’ opinions on welfare and unemployment
programs were more closely aligned with liberals than they were with conservatives (CM Γ =
.35**, ML Γ = .24**). Moreover, the differences in mean scores confirmed that moderates were
more reflective of liberals’ views on government spending than were of conservatives’ views
(CM Γ = .32**, ML Γ = .20**).
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Table 3.E. Public Opinion on Government Spending
Indicators

Values and Responses

Statistics1
Mod.
(n = 736)

Con.
(n = 750)

CM
Γ =∆

1 = Cut back
2 = Kept about the same
3 = Expanded

13.7%
24.5
61.7

.29***

02 Defense
Spending

1 = Expanded
2 = Kept about the same
3 = Cut back

32.0%
44.4
23.6

03 Social
Security

1 = Cut back
2 = Kept about the same
3 = Expanded

11.1%
43.7
45.2

.24**

5.7%
37.0
57.3

.07

5.7%
33.2
61.1

.30**

06 Healthcare

1 = Cut back
2 = Kept about the same
3 = Expanded

36.3%
27.7
36.0

.41***

16.6%
24.3
59.1

.16***

13.6%
18.8
67.6

.53***

10 Welfare and
unemployment
programs at
home

1 = Cut back
2 = Kept about the same
3 = Expanded

59.9%
23.7
16.4

.35**

37.6%
36.1
26.2

.24**

25.1%
37.3
37.5

.54**

Index of Public
Opinion on
Government
Spending3

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

10.30
(2.52)
5-15

Q25.2
01 Education

ø

.32***

6.0%
19.5
74.5
25.5%
44.7
29.8

11.55
(2.17)
5-15

ML
Γ =∆

Lib.
(n = 581)

CL
Γ =∆

.11***

4.8%
16.7
78.5

.38***

ø

.20***

18.8%
41.7
39.6

12.16
(2.20)
5-15

.32***

.47***

CM Γ = ∆, ML Γ = ∆, CL Γ = ∆ represents the difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates, moderates
and liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively at the **p < .01, *p < .05, or ø non-significant levels.
2
Below is a list of present federal government programs. For each, please select whether you feel it should be expanded,
cut back or kept about the same:
3
Index of Pub. Op. on government spending = Q25.01 + Q25.02 + Q25.03 + Q25.06 Q25.10.
1

In summary, all three ideological groups wanted to expand education spending with moderates
and liberals in greatest support for the expansion. Conservatives and moderates wanted
defense spending to be either kept the same or expanded while liberals wanted it kept the same
or cut back. Moderates and liberals aligned in their desire to either maintain or expand Social
Security, healthcare, and welfare and unemployment program spending. Moderates were
generally more reflective of liberals in their views on the allocation of government funds.
Whether or not domestic policy issues affected the praxes of conservatives, moderates, and
liberals on foreign policy remained to be seen.

Political Praxis or Preferred Agents of Influence
A third dimension along which the political sorting hypotheses were tested was the preferred
agents of change or influence. Agents of change were grouped into categories based on the
role that each group occupies in American society. The American People stood alone in their
own category while Congress and the President were placed into an Elected Official category.
U.S. interest groups, large corporations, and universities and think tanks were defined as civil
society (non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest the will and interests of
citizens); religious leaders and military leaders also stood alone in their own categories.
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Overall, conservatives, moderates, and liberals tended to agree about the amount of influence
that the American people and elected officials should have the most influence on foreign policy
(Table 4). While there was a difference between conservatives and liberals on how much
influence elected officials should have, the relationship was weak (Γ = .11**).
Table 4 Preferred Agents of Influence
Indicators

Statistics1

Values and
Responses
Con.

CM
Γ=∆

Mod.

ML
Γ=∆

Lib.

CL
Γ=∆

ø

7.99
(2.26)

ø

8.09
(2.16)

ø

Q125. 2
01 The
American
People
02 Congress

Mean
(SD)

8.00
(2.23)

Mean
(SD)

6.86
(2.58)

6.67
(2.65)

6.77
(2.52)

03 The
President

Mean
(SD)

7.02
(2.71)

7.7
(2.42)

8.11
(2.11)

Index of Elected
Officials3

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

13.93
(4.68)
0-20

04 U.S. interest
groups

Mean
(SD)

3.83
(2.82)

4.48
(2.84)

4.38
(2.94)

05 Large
corporations

Mean
(SD)

3.68
(2.72)

3.99
(2.81)

3.70
(2.91)

06 The media

Mean
(SD)

2.94
(2.89)

3.93
(2.97)

4.11
(3.05)

Mean
(SD)

4.08
(2.86)

5.00
(2.79)

5.46
(2.80)

Index of Civil
Institutions4

Mean
(SD)
Min-Max

14.93
(9.46)
0-40

.18**

17.68
(9.54)
0-40

ø

17.89
(9.17)
0-40

.19***

07 Religious
leaders

Mean
(SD)

4.64
(3.05)

ø

4.21
(2.97)

-.16***

3.51
(3.07)

-.21***

08 Universities
and Think
Tanks

ø

14.41
(4.42)
0-20

ø

14.88
(3.83)
0-20

.11**

-.07*
-.16*** 5.74
-.23***
09 Military
Mean
6.60
6.35
Leaders
(SD)
(2.57)
(2.61)
(2.63)
1
CM r = ∆, ML r = ∆, CL r = ∆ represents the difference of opinion between conservatives and moderates,
moderates and liberals, and conservatives and liberals respectively; **p < .01,* p < .05,
or ø non-significant levels.
2
How much influence do you think the following SHOULD have on U.S. foreign policy. 0 means they should not
at all be influential and 10 means they should be extremely influential.
3
Index of Elected Officials = Q125.02 + Q125.03.
4
Index of Civil Institutions = Q125.04 + Q125.05 + Q125.06 + Q125.07 + Q125.08.

However, differences did emerge between the three groups on how much influence civil
institutions, religious leaders, and military leaders should have; here contrary to moderates’ left
leanings in most issues, moderates tended to side with conservatives instead of liberals.
Conservatives and moderates thought religious and military leaders should have more influence
than liberals. While liberals and moderates believed civil institutions should have more influence
than conservatives. In summary, there were small differences between the three ideological
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groups in how much influence the various agents should have. But, moderates actually were
more aligned with conservatives in their preferred agents of change.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Empirical Implications
Differences emerged between conservatives and liberals on almost every sociodemographic
identity marker, issue, and aspect of praxis, indicative of a clear difference between the two
partisan ideological groups. But, moderates, as expected, were a much more complex group
and effectively inconsistent with either conservative or liberal identity markers, issue opinions, or
praxes.
When it came to identity markers, moderates were more similar to liberals. Unlike
conservatives, moderates were young, female, less religious and less likely to be whites. But
moderates were more like conservatives in their tendency to live in rural/suburban areas instead
of urban/suburban areas, and stood alone in their lower average levels of income and
education. Interviewees #1 and #2 found the sociodemographic markers in this study to be
consistent with how conservatives and liberals are generally perceived and were not surprised
by moderates’ general identity makeup.
While moderates’ identity markers were especially complex, their issue positions more clearly
converged to reflect liberals overall. In four out of five issue areas (military action, environmental
issues, foreign relations, and government spending) moderates leaned to the left, leaving only
the area of immigration policy as a clear reflection of their more conservative views. Essentially,
moderates (like liberals) wanted to maintain a large military in case of necessary intervention.
They believed in climate change and cautiously supported alternative sources of energy while
still considering existing American energy sector jobs. They thought the country should be
engaging in diplomatic relations with foreign governments and even terrorist leaders and be
ready to step in against Iran if they violate the current nuclear deal. And finally, moderates (like
conservatives) displayed anti-immigrant sentiments and strongly desired to control and reduce
illegal immigration. Interviewee #2 posited that the negative connotation that certain people
ascribe to the term, liberal, as careless or reckless in ideology, may have led liberally
opinionated people to self-identify as moderate. On balance, issue positions revealed the
clearest differences between all three ideological groups and showed the clear leanings of
moderates to liberals.
Group political praxes however, were less distinguishable than both issue positions and identity
markers. In other words, conservatives, moderates, and liberals, generally shared a similar idea
of who should be influencing foreign policy. When small differences did arise, moderates had
leanings towards both conservatives and liberals. For example, moderates agreed with liberals
that civil institutions should have more influence than conservatives thought but agreed with
conservatives that religious leaders and military leaders should have more influence than
liberals thought. The mixed bag of praxis and identity markers that moderates turned out to
have made these two factors effectively impossible to sort moderates along.
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Theoretical Implications
By examining identity markers as political sorting measures (as has been done in previous
research) and of hitherto unexamined measures such as issue positions and praxis, this
research has added layers to the complexity at which political sorting takes place in American
society. In this study, it was issue positions along which pronounced differences emerged
among all three groups, followed by identity markers and then praxis. Furthermore, issue
positions revealed a level at which moderates may be sorted slightly to the left while still
maintaining less convictive views than either ideological pole. So while identity markers may still
be a legitimate indicator of political sorting, issue positions (though not always polarized),
represented a clearer set of differences between conservatives, moderates, and liberals.
Interestingly enough, praxis was an especially agreeable axis for all three groups. In other
words, political sorting had limited applicability when it came to political praxis. However, the
general convergence in opinions on who should be influencing foreign policy represents hope
that we, as a nation, are not as divided along ideological lines as we can appear to be.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite offering a more nuanced portrayal of the forgotten middle, moderates, the study was not
without its limitations, both methodological and substantive. On the methodological side,
response rates were too low on many of the questions, so missing data analysis was employed,
thus providing the most accurate approximations of potential answers, but it is unknown how
exact the imputed responses were. Further, attempting to identify political moderates, a diverse
and complicated ideological group, with but a single self-identification on a seven-point scale,
was rather limiting. Similar limitations hampered measurement of issue and praxis positions.
Future research should investigate more specifically what agents of change ideological groups
want to be at the forefront of various issues, such as the ones examined in this research.
And finally, research should also attempt to combine the Pew Research Center’s typology of the
political middle with uncovering groups’ praxes as a way to better understand the locus of
change that the American people think is ideal. Linking issue positions with praxis ideas might
offer a clearer portrayal of political moderates.
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Appendix A
Consent From and Interview Protocol
Consent Form
Dear _______________:
I am a Sociology Senior working on my Research Capstone Paper under the direction of Professor
Marilyn Fernandez in the Department of Sociology at Santa Clara University. I am conducting my
research on self-identified political moderates and their ideology and praxis as compared to conservatives
and liberals.
You were selected for this interview, because of your knowledge of and experience working in the area of
Political Science.
I am requesting your participation, which will involve responding to questions about the formation of
people’s political ideologies and the factors that contribute to people’s political ideologies and will last
about 20 minutes. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose to not
participate or to withdraw from the interview at any time. The results of the research study may be
presented at SCU’s Annual Anthropology/Sociology Undergraduate Research Conference and published
(in a Sociology department publication). Pseudonyms will be used in lieu of your name and the name of
your organization in the written paper. You will also not be asked (nor recorded) questions about your
specific characteristics, such as age, race, sex, religion.
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please call/email me at akwo@scu.edu or (317)
292-2250 or Dr. Fernandez at (408) -554-4432 mfernandez@scu.edu
Sincerely,
Alec Kwo
By signing below you are giving consent to participate in the above study. (If the interviewee was
contacted by email or phone, request an electronic message denoting consent).
______________________
____________________
____________
Signature
Printed Name
Date
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Committee, through Office of
Research Compliance and Integrity at (408) 554-5591.

Interview Protocol
1.
2.
3.
4.

What is the organization/institution where you learned about political ideology?
What is your position in this organization?
How long have you been in this position and in this organization?
Based on what you know about partisanship and ideological leanings on public opinion,
where do political moderates stand in relation to conservatives and liberals?
5. Are moderates generally left out of political discourse?
6. Do you know of certain factors that contribute to people being conservative, moderate,
or liberal?
7. Have you ever heard of moderates leaning left on most issues?

171

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol14/iss1/11

20

Kwo: The Ideology and Praxis of Political Moderates:More Liberal than

REFERENCES
Abramowitz, Alan I. and Kyle L. Saunders. 2005. “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The
Reality of Polarized America.” The Forum 3(2):1-22.
Ansolabehere, Steven, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder. 2006. ‘‘Purple America.’’
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(2):97-118.
Baldassarri, Delia and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans without Constraint: Political
Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion.” American Journal of
Sociology 114(2):408-46. http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1010098
Baldassarri, Delia and Amir Goldberg. 2014. “Neither Ideologues nor Agnostics: Alternative
Voters’ Belief System in an Age of Partisan Politics.” American Journal of Sociology
120(1):45-95. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676042
Baldassarri, Delia and Peter Bearman. 2007. “Dynamics of Political Polarization.” American
Sociological Review 72(5):784-811.
2005. Beyond Red vs. Blue: Republicans Divided About Role of Government – Democrats by
Social and Personal Values. The Pew Charitable Trusts. Washington, D.C.: Pew
Research Center, Retrieved December 7, 2015 (http://www.peoplepress.org/2005/05/10/beyond-red-vs-blue/).
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Bond, Robert and Messing Solomon. 2015. "Quantifying Social Media's Political Space:
Estimating Ideology from Publicly Revealed Preferences on Facebook." The American
Political Science Review 109(1):62-78.
(http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/1695749404?accountid=13679).
doi: http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.scu.edu/10.1017/S0003055414000525.
Carmines, Edward G. and James A. Stimson 1980. “The Two Faces of Issue Voting.” American
Political Science Review 74(?):78-91. doi:10.2307/1955648.
Conover, Pamela Johnston and Stanley Feldman. 1981. “The Origins and Meaning of
Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications.” American Journal of Political
Science 25(4):617-630.
Feldman, Stanely and Christopher Johnston. 2013. “Understanding the Determinants of Political
Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity.” International Society of Political
Psychology 35(3):337-58.
Fiorina, Morris P., with Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2005. Culture War? The Myth
of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman.
Fiorina, Morris P., with Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope. 2008. Polarization in the
American public: Misconceptions and misreadings. Journal of Politics 70(2):556-60.
Interviewee #1. November 20, 2015. Assistant Professor of Political Science.
172

Published by Scholar Commons, 2016

21

Silicon Valley Notebook, Vol. 14 [2016], Art. 11

Interviewee #2. February 24, 2016. Lecturer of Political Science.
Levitin, Teresa E. and Warren E. Miller. 1979. "Ideological Interpretations of Presidential
Elections." American Political Science Review 73(3):751-71.
(http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/38324782?accountid=13679).
Levendusky, Matthew S. 2008. “Clearer Elites, More Consistent Voters: The Effects of Elite
Polarization on Attitude Consistency in the Mass Public.” Conference Papers -American Political Science Association 1-34.
Mason, Lillian. 2012. “Partisan sorting and behavioral polarization in the American electorate.”
Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association, 1-43.
Mason, Liilian. 2015. “'I Disrespectfully Agree': The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on
Social and Issue Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59(1):128-45.
Robinson, John P. and John Holm. 1980. "IDEOLOGICAL VOTING IS ALIVE AND
WELL." POPULATION STUDIES 3(2):52-8
(http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.scu.edu/docview/60847411?accountid=13679).
Smeltz, Dina, Craig Kafura, Ivo Daalder, Benjamin Page, Gregory Holyk, Joshua Busby,
Jonathan Monten, and Jordan Tama. Chicago Council Survey of American Public
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014. ICPSR36216-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2015-08-06.
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36216.v1
Wood, Thomas and Oliver, Erik. 2012. “Toward a More Reliable Implementation of Ideology in
Measures of Public Opinion.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76(4):636-62.
(https://login.libproxy.scu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.
aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=83746286&site=ehost-live).

173

https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol14/iss1/11

22

